Despite housing's importance to the economy and worries about recent financial and economic turmoil traceable to housing market difficulties, until recently little has been written on how distress in the housing market, measured by foreclosures, affects home prices, or how foreclosures and home prices interact with other macroeconomic or housing variables such as employment, housing permits or sales. Employing a panel VAR model to examine quarterly state-level data, our paper is the first to systematically analyze these interactions. There is substantial regional variation across states, which facilitates our ability to identify linkages among variables. Price-foreclosure linkages work in both directions. Foreclosures have a significant but small negative effect on home prices. In contrast, an increase in prices substantially reduces foreclosures. These results suggest that the low-frequency association observed between foreclosures and prices is driven by the endogenous adjustment of foreclosures to price changes via the strategic foreclosure choices of home owners and lenders, rather than through the effects of foreclosure shocks on home prices.
Bankers Association (MBA) quarterly delinquency surveys to measure outstanding foreclosures relative to mortgages), we find a close fit between the two series, both on an annual basis and for the period as a whole (R-squares for the four regressions range between 0.48 and 0.75). The close association of these two series is often noted in the popular press, and is the source of continuing concern that a rising rate of foreclosures will depress housing further by dumping supply on a battered market. This concern over the effect of foreclosures on prices is cited as justification for mortgage modification policies such as the HAMP (Home Affordable Modification Program) and foreclosure moratoria enacted by some states in late 2008. The hope is that by preventing foreclosures such programs may stop (or slow) the decline in home prices and restore stability to the housing market.
Of course, Figure 1 's description of the low-frequency association between price change and foreclosures growth says nothing about the causal relationships between prices and foreclosures, and should not be interpreted as providing an estimate of the response of prices to foreclosure shocks. This regression line reflects a combination of three influences: (1) the responses of prices to foreclosure shocks, (2) the responses of foreclosures to price shocks, and (3) the responses of both foreclosures and prices to shocks originating in other variables.
We focus our attention in this paper on measuring the relative importance of these three influences. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate the impact of foreclosures on house prices for the U.S. as a whole, and the first to investigate that question within a dynamic model of housing market conditions and the local (state-level) economy. Our model is capable of disentangling the various contributing influences that could explain the low-frequency association between foreclosures and price changes, and thus allows us to gauge the potential housing-price and macroeconomic consequences of continuing mortgage distress.
Modeling the housing market at the state level is helpful for improving empirical identification. Quarterly data on the main housing variables of interest exist for each state going back to 1981. Although there have been only three nationwide housing cycles since the 1980s, there have been numerous state-or regional-level cycles, which often have entailed significant price declines and increases in foreclosures. Furthermore, even within a given national economic cycle there is wide variation across states in employment growth, net migration, and other factors that can affect local housing markets. As a result, there is substantial variation in housing market experiences across states, which can be useful for identifying empirical linkages among variables. Leamer (2007) notes that no macroeconomics textbook contains any lengthy treatment of real estate, despite its central role as a leading indicator of business cycle conditions. Instead, academic studies tend to focus on aspects of the housing market and the broader economy in isolation from each other, such as examining the interaction of house prices and home sales, but nothing else. Despite the importance of housing to the economy, little has been written about the interaction between prices and foreclosures at the aggregate level, and to our knowledge nothing has been written that links prices and foreclosures dynamically within the broader context of the macroeconomic environment and other conditions in the housing market. This is an important omission when one considers that the impact of financial liquidation on measures of prices and output in the economy is highly controversial; some fear that allowing liquidations will cause further distress for home prices, while others have pointed to episodes in which dragging out the liquidation process leads to prolonged large, negative effects on asset prices (Anari, Kolari and Mason (2005) ).
Some papers have considered the effect of housing on aggregate economic activity as measured by GDP. Green (1997) examines residential investment and GDP, and finds the former Granger-causes the latter. Coulson and Kim (2000) find that residential investment shocks are important in predicting consumption and GDP growth. Gauger and Snyder (2003) use a vector error-correction (VECM) model and find, as did Green (1997) , that residential investment has a positive impact on GDP. Leamer (2007) performs a series of estimations and historical decompositions and finds that residential investment is the best predictor of future recessions in the U.S.
At the macro level, little has been written about the empirical relationships between home prices and foreclosures or other measures of financial distress, although some have examined how price volatility may affect the probability of default (Foster and Van Order, 1984) . In contrast, a number of recent studies have used micro data to assess the interaction of foreclosures and prices. Willen, Gerardi and Shapiro (2008) , using data from Massachusetts, find that the recent decrease in prices was a major catalyst in pushing sub-prime borrowers into foreclosure. Examining the opposite direction of causality, Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) use a random sample of about twenty percent of all U.S. mortgages, including only those which are conforming, and find that there is a clear negative impact of foreclosures on prices of local homes. They find that this effect of foreclosure is much larger during a housing downturn than during a boom, indicating the importance of controlling for the state of the housing cycle when measuring the effects of foreclosures. Leonard and Murdoch (2008) investigate foreclosures in the greater Dallas area, and similarly uncover a negative effect of housing distress on prices, which diminishes as distance from the foreclosed property grows. Neither of these studies, however, control for the number of non-distressed homes available for sale at the time of foreclosure, so their results do not distinguish between the "distress" effect of foreclosure and the "supply" impact of simply adding more homes for sale in the market. Rogers and Winter (2009) examine foreclosures in St. Louis county and find the expected negative impact. Interestingly, they also find that the marginal impact of additional foreclosures declines as foreclosures increase, which contradicts the proposition that rising foreclosure rates may have a rising incremental effect on house prices. The authors, while examining the impact of foreclosures on prices, also acknowledge the endogeneity issue and the possibility that there is an impact of prices on foreclosures. The authors concede that simultaneity bias is an issue, but state that they cannot find an instrument for foreclosures. They note therefore that "claims of causation must be made cautiously" (p. 6). Similarly, another study of home price change (OFHEO 2007) found no evidence that, on average, neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates suffered greater price declines, ceteris paribus. Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2008) employ data from Massachusetts to distinguish the different price behavior of "forced" sales (foreclosure sales or those motivated by bankruptcy or the death of the owner) from unforced sales. The authors find that the price impacts of forced and unforced sales are quite different. Unforced sales pricing appears efficient, in that prices are close to a random walk. Forced sales, by comparison, display pricing that is clearly mean-reverting. The authors then attempt to discern the impact of forced sales on unforced sales, and find "the prices of forced sales had relatively little predictive power for the prices of other transactions in the housing market" (p. 3). Thus it appears that foreclosure sales are a special type of sales, distinct form less distressed transactions, and may thus have little effect on the prices of other houses. To the extent that this finding generalizes, it could have important implications for foreclosure prevention policies.
Despite the recent increased interest in modeling the relationship between prices and foreclosures, our study is the first of which we are aware to systematically investigate the interaction of financial distress, housing market conditions and the local economy.
In the next section, we present the results of our estimation model. We find that foreclosures have a negative, significant effect on prices. The magnitude of this effect, however, is small. That suggests that house prices are quite sticky even in the face of high financial distress, and that fears of foreclosures causing large price declines are exaggerated. In contrast, the effect of house price shocks on foreclosures is large and statistically significant. For the most part, the strong low-frequency association between prices and foreclosures visible in Figure 1 reflects the endogenous response of foreclosures to price shocks, not vice versa. Section III explores the robustness of the findings presented in Section II. Section IV concludes. A detailed description of our data and a discussion of some technical aspects of our methodology can be found in the appendix. State-Level Housing Market, 1981 We model home prices and foreclosures at the state level, using quarterly data since 1981, and treat the growth of home prices and the foreclosure rate as part of a fivevariable system of equations, which also includes the growth rates of employment, single-family permits, and existing home sales. We employ a panel vector autoregressive model (PVAR) that captures the dynamic linkages among all five variables, which are all treated as mutually endogenous.
II. A Quarterly Panel VAR Model of the
More specifically, we employ the following data in our analysis. Employment is measured as the log difference of the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted monthly total non-farm employment for each state. Sales is the log difference of the seasonallyadjusted annual rate of existing home sales in each state as reported by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Permits is the log difference of the quarterly average of the monthly seasonally-adjusted annual rate of single-family residential building permits for each state. Prices is the log difference of the FHFA all-transactions home price index (inclusive of same-home sales and refinancings).
1 Finally, Foreclosures is the log of the ratio of outstanding foreclosures to total mortgages for each state based on MBA surveys.
A detailed description of how each of the variables used in our analysis is constructed can be found in the appendix.
We also ran a version the model defining foreclosures as the log difference of the foreclosure rate, with very similar results. We report results using the log level of the foreclosure rate because doing so should better capture the effects of cumulative financial distress on house prices, which is relevant during foreclosure waves like those 1 In what follows we also discuss results when we employ the FHFA purchase-only index. As we discuss in more detail below, we believe that including refinancings when measuring price change is desirable, because it reduces any bias arising from variation in the types of homes that sell over different phases of the housing cycle.
using a procedure described in the appendix; in our robustness checks we demonstrate that keeping these observations has no substantive impact on our key results.
Due to the forward (Helmert) de-meaning of observations used to control for state fixed effects, we lose the last observation, and thus our useable sample runs through the third quarter of 2009. 2 After some experimentation with different lag lengths, we found that eight quarterly lags encompassed quite well all the significant dynamic relationships among these five variables. The PVAR regression results are shown in Table 1 .
In order to generate impulse responses and variance decompositions, one must identify the sources of covariance among the residuals in each of the five equations. We follow the existing PVAR literature by employing the Choleski decomposition, which models the residuals matrix as a recursive, triangular system. The main advantage of that approach is its simplicity: one selects an ordering of variables that posits the degree of within-quarter endogeneity among each of the five endogenous variables.
We experimented with various possible orderings among the five variables and found that our key results regarding the relationship between home prices and foreclosures were robust to the orderings chosen, which reflects the generally low contemporaneous correlations among shocks in our system of equations; most of the observed connections among variables occur only with a lag (the exceptions are the high contemporaneous correlations between permits shocks and shocks to employment and sales). We report only one ordering: employment, sales, permits, prices, foreclosures.
Employment appears first in our ordering, since we assume that any correlations between within-quarter innovations in employment and the within-quarter innovations in our four housing-sector variables reflect the role of employment as a source of disturbance (both with respect to the labor market and as a general macroeconomic barometer).
Foreclosures are placed at the end of our ordering because foreclosure reflects the strategic decisions of borrowers and lenders; thus we think it is appropriate to allow foreclosure decisions to respond to other variables within the quarter. We place price changes second to last in our system. Within-quarter price shocks are not strongly correlated with foreclosure shocks (the correlation is -0.0557, as shown in Table 2 Two of the impulse responses merit particular attention, given the focus of our study. The impulse response of prices to foreclosure shocks is significant. However, it is small in magnitude and statistically significant for only one quarter. In contrast, the impact of prices on foreclosures is much larger in magnitude, and is significant (and growing) for all ten quarters. Thus in interpreting Figure 1 , evidence from our impulse response functions indicates that the impact of prices on foreclosures accounts for much more of the negative relationship between the two variables than the effect of foreclosures on prices. Fears that foreclosure shocks produce important declines in home prices are not supported by the impulse responses. That result is consistent with the findings of Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2008) , using a different model and a more narrowly defined sample, as described above.
The variance decompositions (Table 3) Whenever VAR or PVAR models include asset prices, a potential interpretation problem arises. Asset prices should be forward-looking measures of value, and therefore may foresee influences originating in other variables. For example, it is conceivable that adverse housing price shocks may occur in anticipation of foreclosure shocks that are predictable to market participants. If that were true, foreclosures would properly be viewed as causing declines in house prices even though the declines in house prices predate (and Granger-cause) foreclosure shocks.
Our empirical results, however, do not support that reverse-timing causation story. There is little contemporaneous correlation between housing price shocks and foreclosure shocks (the correlation is -0.06), suggesting that house prices are unresponsive to news about foreclosures. The largest coefficient on lagged house prices in the foreclosure regression has a lag of three quarters, and the effect of house prices on foreclosures reaches its peak after more than two years in the impulse responses. It is implausible therefore to argue that house price shocks reflect home buyers' ability to forecast foreclosure shocks (foreclosure increases unrelated to current or lagged foreclosure experience or other lagged housing variables) many months in advance.
Moreover, our results indicate that housing prices generally are not important predictors of other housing variables (i.e., housing sales or housing permits); the contribution of housing prices to the forecast variance of those two variables is negligible. These results confirm the widespread view that, unlike stock or bond prices, housing prices do not respond quickly to long-term shifts in housing market supply and demand. We conclude that the predictive role of housing prices for foreclosures primarily reflects the endogenous reactions of homeowners and lenders to declining house prices (e.g., to
foreclose instead of renegotiating the terms of a mortgage), rather than the adjustments of housing prices to future foreclosure shocks in the distant future that are anticipated by market participants.
III. Robustness
In this section we consider several robustness checks on our results. First, we consider whether nonlinearities in the effects of foreclosures on house prices could be important, and might alter the conclusions of our analysis. Second, we re-run our model adding back the initial periods in each state that we had removed when estimating our model due to concerns about noise in the house price data. Third, we consider whether our results are robust to redefining house prices in real rather than nominal terms. Finally,
we consider potential problems associated with the house price index used in our study.
Nonlinear Foreclosure Effects
One possible concern about the estimation and simulation results reported in Tables There is reason to be concerned about the potential importance of nonlinearity, given some of the extreme values observed for foreclosures and prices in our sample.
Figure 3 plots each of the five variables in our system for a select group of states. As the graphs show, there was significant variation in all of the series at the state level during previous periods, but nevertheless, the recent experience of price declines and foreclosure increases is unprecedented in many of the states in our sample. Figure 4 shows that, for all but a few states, the foreclosure rate as of the fourth quarter of 2009 is the highest in that state's history, and in some cases, the current foreclosure rates are higher than rates previously experienced by any state. As Figure 5 shows, those same high foreclosure rate states also tend to be states that could be considered outliers with respect to their price experience; only eight states saw price declines of greater than 15 percent from 2007 to 2010, but their average declines are twice those of the next most severely affected states.
Given these extreme values in foreclosures and prices, to the extent that nonlinear effects exist, they could have important implications for the states that are the most severely affected by the housing crisis.
The principal concern relating to nonlinearity is that it may affect our conclusion that foreclosure shocks produce only small changes in home prices. In particular, if the incremental effects of foreclosures on prices are greater when foreclosure rates are high, then our estimated effects (observed over the whole sample period, during which foreclosure rates averaged far below the current rates) may give an inaccurate indication of the effect of foreclosures on prices today. Table 4 for a detailed description), and see whether nonlinearities in the impact of foreclosure rates on home prices are potentially important. Table 4 reports the total effects at each lag of foreclosures on prices from the price equation, measured as the sum of linear and quadratic coefficients at each lag for the two foreclosure variables, evaluated at the mean value of the de-meaned log foreclosure rate across all states in our sample period. These total effects are also graphed in Figure 6 . This provides a comparison of the impact of foreclosure growth on price growth (excluding the feedback effects that would be present in the full PVAR model) for the quadratic and linear functional forms. We emphasize that because this stand-alone regression (unlike our PVAR model) does not allow feedback effects among the variables in the system, it only provides a rough gauge of the differences in impact of foreclosure shocks on prices under linear and nonlinear specifications.
As Table 4 and Figure 6 show, the overall cumulative effects of the two functional forms are not very different; the quadratic version implies only a 5.93 percent larger cumulative price decline from a foreclosure shock than what is predicted under the linear specification. We interpret this to mean that taking into account nonlinear functional forms would produce only slightly greater simulated price declines than suggested by our linear model.
As an additional check, we estimated our model for an abbreviated period, ending Contrary to the hypothesis of nonlinearity in the effect of foreclosures on house prices, adding years in which foreclosures are higher than the sample mean does not increase the estimated impact of foreclosure shocks.
3
Restoring Omitted Early Observations
The FHFA house price indices are constructed using a weighted repeat sales methodology. This method of measuring house prices is prone to noisy price problems in the early years of the sample (when the number of same-house sales is small). In the estimates reported in Section II, we eliminated early observations for each state based on a volatility criterion, as discussed in the appendix. Here we restore those omitted observations and test for whether including those observations affects our results. We find that our results are qualitatively similar. As Figure 7 shows, when we retain the early "noisy" observations, the impulse response function of prices with respect to foreclosure shocks does display slightly larger and more protracted negative effects, but the effects are still very small and not important from the standpoint of forecast variance.
Indeed, the variance decompositions (shown in Table 5 ) show that when the full data are used, foreclosure shocks explain less than 2 percent of the variance in prices at 20 lags.
In contrast, foreclosure responses to price shocks remain large and important, as before.
Real vs. Nominal House Prices
Next, we consider whether deflating house prices using the consumer price index affects our results. Given the low and relatively stable rates of inflation in the U.S. economy during our sample period, we chose not to deflate house prices in our estimation in Section II, since deflating can be a source of measurement error. When we use
as starting values for the state-level means (see the appendix for more details). One might be concerned that the high foreclosure rates in 2009 could bias the PVAR estimations. The fact that our results using the pre-2008 sample (with the lower staring values for mean foreclosures) are similar to our baseline results allays that concern.
deflated rather than nominal house prices in our model, the impulse responses are quite similar to those in our baseline model (Figure 7) , as are the variance decompositions (Table 5) .
Different Measures of House Prices
Our model uses the comprehensive FHFA all-transactions index (including both sales and refinancings) as our measure of house prices in each state in each quarter. The FHFA also produces a purchase-only index, which excludes refinancing when determining repeat transactions. We believe on a priori grounds that the all-transactions is the least-biased concept of price to employ for the purposes of this study, since it does not suffer as much from selectivity bias relating to cyclical variation in the composition and frequency of home sales.
As a robustness check, however, we did run a version of our model using the FHFA purchase-only index as the measure of house prices, with qualitatively similar results. Because the purchase-only index is not available for the earliest years of our sample period (prior to 1991), we used the all-transactions index for those early years and spliced the two series (as discussed in the appendix). Once again, Figure 7 illustrates that the effects of price and foreclosure shocks on prices and foreclosure impulse responses are quite similar. The variance decompositions are also quite similar, as shown in Table 5 .
One further measure of house price appreciation -the Case-Shiller index -is often reported in the press, and this index has suggested that housing prices declines over the final years of our study was much greater than that measured by the FHFA index.
While we would like to run a version of our model using the Case-Shiller index as well, it
is not available at the state level or for a sufficiently long time period to be used in this study. There are several reasons to believe, however, that our conclusions would be similar if state-level Case-Shiller indices were available for our Panel VAR model.
First, both indices measure the same underlying phenomenon -home price appreciation -with error. As can be seen in Figure 8 , the U.S. Case-Shiller index exhibits more quarterly volatility than the U.S. FHFA index, but changes in the two indices are strongly correlated (0.51) and this correlation is even higher at lower frequencies (0.89 at the annual level). Thus, if the Case-Shiller index were used, the lowfrequency relationships among the variables in the system should be qualitatively similar to what we find using the FHFA index.
Second, we test that conjecture using the aggregate U.S. versions of the two indices. Table 6 shows correlations between prices and the other variables in the system.
These correlations are qualitatively similar regardless of the price index used, although the growth rate of sales and permits are more strongly correlated with home price appreciation using the Case-Shiller index, while foreclosures are more closely tied to price changes using the FHFA index.
Third, to further explore differences across the two measures of home prices, we ran a VAR with four quarterly lags using the U.S. aggregate values of all of the variables in our system, first using the FHFA index and then using the Case-Shiller index. 4 The impulse responses of prices to foreclosure shocks and foreclosures to price shocks for each VAR are shown in Figure 9 . The impulse responses were statistically insignificant in almost every instance (including those for the variables not appearing in Figure 9 ), likely reflecting both the smaller sample size available for a national VAR and the loss of regional variation when using aggregate data. We believe this provides further support of our use of state-level data in our PVAR specification. Nevertheless, the point estimates of the impulse responses are qualitatively similar for each of the two price measures. As a result, we see no reason to suspect that our basic conclusions would change if statelevel Case-Shiller indices were available and used for the analysis in Section II.
We conclude that our central results are quite robust to possible variations in samples and specifications. The effect of foreclosure shocks on prices appears to be much smaller than is sometimes supposed. Even in the face of an extreme foreclosure wave such as that experienced after 2007, our evidence indicates that foreclosure shocks have relatively small effects on U.S. house prices.
VI. Conclusion
Our study is the first to model the high-frequency dynamic relationships among house prices, foreclosures, employment, house permits, and house sales. We do so using Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses below the regression coefficients. *** Coefficient significant at the 0.1% level. ** Coefficient significant at the 1% level. * Coefficient significant at the 5% level. The variables used in the analysis are as follows:
• Employment − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted monthly total non-farm employment for the state.
• Sales − Growth rate (log difference) of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate of existing home sales for the state in the quarter.
• Permits − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly average of the monthly seasonally-adjusted annual rate of single-family residential building permits for the state.
• Prices − Growth rate (log difference) of the quarterly FHFA house price index (all transactions) for the state.
• Foreclosures − Log level of the MBA quarterly foreclosure inventory as a percent of loans serviced for the state. All regression variables were de-meaned using a Helmert transformation, while the actual values of the variables were used as instruments to obtain consistent estimates. Notes: All variables are Helmert de-meaned log differences of levels except for foreclosures, which is the (de-meaned) log foreclosure rate (see the notes on Table 1 and the appendix for a complete description of the variables); p-values are reported in parentheses. Notes: Cumulative effects are the sum of all the lags, and represent the effect of a mean value (-0.357) shock that persists for nine periods. These effects are graphed in Figure 6 . Explanation of Table 4 : The entries above were calculated as follows. For the second column (Linear Specification), fixed-effect panel regressions of the HPI growth rate on eight lags of all five system variables along with contemporaneous values of the four exogenous variables were run. As in the text, fixed effects were controlled for by Helmert de-meaning the data, while the actual values of the variables were used as instruments to obtain consistent estimates. The column 2 values are then derived by taking the coefficients for each lag of the log foreclosure rate and multiplying them by -0.357, the mean value of the de-meaned log foreclosure rate across all states in our sample period. Thus, the table entries represent the total impact on the HPI growth rate from a mean value shock in the log level of the foreclosure rate the specified number of periods in the past. For column 3 (Quadratic Specification), a quadratic term on the log foreclosure rate is included in the above panel regression. The values in this column are calculated in a similar fashion, providing an estimate of the total price impact (both linear and quadratic) of a mean value shock to the growth rate of foreclosures. The final column is the percentage difference between the second and third column; a positive number indicates that a foreclosure shock has a bigger price impact under a quadratic specification than it does with a linear specification. Detailed regression results for both the Linear and Quadratic Specifications are available from the authors upon request. Response of lfor to lfor shock Note: Impulse responses are based on growth rates (difference of logs) of all variables in the system except the foreclosure rate, which is modeled as a log level. The impulse responses are derived using a Cholesky decomposition with the following ordering: employment, sales, permits, prices (HPI), and foreclosure rate. Note: Lines show the total impact of a mean value (-0.357) log foreclosure rate shock on the HPI growth rate at the specified lag if the impact of foreclosures is modeled using the indicated specification. A detailed description of their calculation is provided in the notes to Note: This figure shows the impulse responses functions for prices on foreclosures (left column) and foreclosures on prices (right column) from a 4-lag VAR model using aggregate U.S. data. In the first row, prices are the log difference of the FHFA all-transactions index for the U.S., while in the second row prices are measured as the log difference of the Case-Shiller U.S. national house price index (not seasonally adjusted). All four impulse responses are statistically insignificant at less than 12 quarters except for the FHFA index, which shows a modest negative response of prices to a foreclosure shock.
Data and Methodology Appendix
Data Sources
Prices: FHFA All-Transactions House Price Indices
Our home price appreciation measure comes from the state-level, all-transactions house price indices produced by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). We use the 2010Q1 release of these data, which include observations from 1975Q1 through 2010Q1. We renormalize these indices to set 2007Q4 as the base quarter.
Some of the state HPIs exhibit a large amount of volatility in the early years of the sample, presumably because of a paucity of repeat transactions for deriving the price index. In our preferred specification we drop early observations of the HPIs based on the following procedure. For each state we calculate the mean and standard deviation of the quarterly change in the quarterly log-difference of the HPI after 1994. Using the full sample, we determine the last quarter for which this change exceeds five standard deviations of the calculated post-1994 mean, and drop all observations up through this quarter.
In our robustness checks, we also use the full-sample (unrestricted) alltransactions price indices, as well as the FHFA purchase-only price indices. Because the purchase-only indices start at 1991Q1, we join the purchase-only index with the corresponding all-transactions index (both renormalized to 1991Q1) to provide full coverage through the entire sample period. The resulting spliced indices are then normalized to set 2007Q4 as the base quarter.
All of our regressions measure home price appreciation as the log difference of these indices, not seasonally adjusted.
Foreclosures: Foreclosure Rate
Historical values of the foreclosure rate come from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) Quarterly Delinquency Survey, which provides the number of mortgage loans in foreclosure as a percent of all loans serviced. These data run from 1979Q1 through 209Q4 and are not seasonally adjusted.
We use the log level of the foreclosure rate in our primary regression specifications, although in our robustness checks we also run specifications that use the log difference of the foreclosure rate.
Permits: Single-family Residential Building Permits
The Bureau of the Census prepares a monthly release of building permits by state (not seasonally adjusted); these are available back to January 1988. We used the Census X12 program using default settings to calculate the seasonally adjusted annualized rate of single family building permits for each state beginning in 1988. To extend the data back to January 1980, we merged it with data provided by Economy.com. 5 We use the quarterly average of these monthly figures as our measure of permits. All of our regressions measure the growth rate of permits as the log difference of these quarterly averages. Because permits are zero in some states for some quarters (most notably the District of Columbia), we added one to each of the quarterly permit values before taking logs.
Employment: Total Non-farm Employment
Total non-farm employment by state (not seasonally adjusted) is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics dating back to 1960. We seasonally adjusted each monthly state series using the Census X12 program using default settings. 6 We then calculated the quarterly average of these figures. All of our regressions measure the growth rate of employment as the log difference of these quarterly averages.
Sales: Single-family Existing Home Sales
The monthly, seasonally-adjusted annual rate of existing, single-family home sales for each state is available from the National Association of Realtors. These data are available dating back to the beginning of 1981. . In other words, each of the first T − 1 observations are de-meaned using all future observations (with the next-to-last observation demeaned by the final observation, which is lost from the sample). The weighting
